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1. Introduction: What is ethics and economics as a single subject of investigation?
The subject of this Oxford Handbook volume is ethics and economics. Accordingly, a
fundamental issue it must address is: what makes ‘ethics and economics’ a single subject of
investigation. Indeed, ethics and economics taken in themselves each constitute distinct types of
investigation, as reflected in the fact that they have long been carried out in two separate disciplines
by two largely independent groups of researchers, respectively, philosophers and economists.
Their long histories as distinct disciplines thus create a barrier to understanding how together they
constitute a single subject of investigation, and the fact that they have each developed in relative
independence from one another also suggests that there exist inherent barriers in the way each is
understood to combining them in a single field of investigation. It seems a mistake, then, to
proceed with a discussion of ethics and economics without first reaching an understanding at least
some of the issues involved. However, this does not seem to be the starting point for much work
that exists on economics and ethics, which instead often investigates how economics and ethics
are connected – for example, in discussions of equity-efficiency tradeoffs – without first
establishing what the relationship between ethics and economics is.
Where should one start, then, if we are to identify economics and ethics as a single subject of
investigation? Given their independent histories, it would be natural to begin by saying that since
ethics and economics have long been essentially independent fields of investigation, understanding
what economics and ethics is should be framed in terms of an established discourse on the
relationships between different disciplines. For example, perhaps ethics and economics should be
understood as an ‘interdisciplinary’ type of investigation that somehow falls between and yet also
combines ethics and economics. However, this strategy encounters the problem that there exists
more than one conception of how different disciplines are related, interdisciplinarity being only
one such type of relationship, and considerable debate over the different types of relationships
between different disciplines. One taxonomy of the possibilities is as follows:
Interdisciplinary research or collaboration creates a new discipline or project, such as
interfield research, often leaving the existence of the original ones
intact. Multidisciplinary work involves the juxtaposition of the treatments and aims of the
different disciplines involved in addressing a common problem. Crossdisciplinary work
involves borrowing resources from one discipline to serve the aims of a project in another.
Transdisciplinary work is a synthetic creation that encompasses work from different
disciplines (Cat 2017: sect. 3.3).
So, it seems that before identifying what economics and ethics is, we need to start at an even more
basic level, first examine more broadly the ways in which different systems of thinking can be
relatively independent but also interact, and then use any understanding that this provides to make
judgments about what kind of relationship exists between ethics and economics.
The strategy for doing this adopted in this chapter is closest to the transdisciplinarity idea in that
it employs a complex systems approach that treats ethics and economics as two different systems
that interact in a single complex system. A complex systems approach takes the interaction of
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different systems as its starting point, and perhaps paradoxically explains their relative
independence in terms of how they interact. That is, it does not begin with different disciplines,
set them out first independently of one another, and then ask how they interact, since this strategy
runs the risk of assuming they are largely unaffected by their interaction. Let me illustrate with a
comparison of two ways of thinking about virtue in relation to economics.
One might then begin with virtue ethics as investigated in ethics, and apply that virtue ethics in an
entirely new setting, say, in circumstances where economic behavior appears to resemble virtue
behavior, and then conclude that the essential logic of that virtue ethics is unaffected by its
application to the economic world. The context of application, that is, does not matter because it
has been assumed away at the start by an independent disciplines-based strategy of analysis. The
conviction that economics and ethics is an interdisciplinarity subject of investigation, as
characterized above, then, would support this mode of analysis.
Alternatively, in a complex systems approach, it might instead be argued that ‘virtue-like’ behavior
in the economic world differs significantly from what a traditional virtue ethics assumes, because
a change in context has transformative effects upon that behavior. That is, context of application
matters. Standard economics assumes Homo economicus agents are rational optimizers, but
rational optimization is not part of what virtue ethics traditionally involves, so explaining ‘virtuelike’ behavior in the economic world transforms ethics’ conception of virtue ethics. This mode of
analysis has transdisciplinarity as its point of entry.
My point here concerns our mode of analysis of ethics and economics. Specifically, if we believe
that ethics and economics is a single subject of investigation, we need to adopt an approach that
treats it as a single complex system. It may well be, of course, that the interaction between
economics and ethics which an ethics and economics would investigate in many cases does not
have the transformative effects on either. For example, it could well be the case that ‘virtue-like’
behavior in the economic world does not differ significantly from what a traditional virtue ethics
assumes. A complex systems approach should allow for this ‘small’ effects of interaction
possibility just as it allows for a ‘large’ effects of interaction possibility. Indeed, which results we
get will likely depend on the issues investigated. Thus, to put this complex systems approach to
work we need to determine what issues in ethics and economics deserve examination.
Yet rather than proceed in a piecemeal, issue-by-issue manner, in this chapter I will instead look
more broadly at transformative effects that ethics and economics might each have on one another
in terms of two opposing visions of what ethics and economics might be about: one in which ethics
as a whole has transformative effects on economics as a whole – which I associate with a social
economic vision of the subject – and one in which economics as a whole has transformative effects
on ethics as a whole – which I associate with the standard or mainstream economics vision of the
subject.
One advantage of beginning in this way, then, is that it raises fundamental issues about what ethics
and economics is as a single subject of investigation. Is it largely framed by ethics, by economics,
or by both more or less equally? Or better, assuming there are differences of opinion on this
question among ethics and economics researchers, what does each position imply about what
ethics and economics is?
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My own view is that a social economic vision best describes ethics and economics. The
mainstream economics vision, however, is likely more familiar to people because it has been so
influential. Its individualist emphasis frames ethical issues in the language of economics. Thus, I
close these introductory remarks with a brief description of social economics as a distinct approach
within economics.
Social economics originated in eighteenth century Europe as an investigation of cooperative
economic relationships rooted in community social values – its object being the économie sociale
or the Gemeinwirtschaft. Its main assumption is that human society is everywhere and always
value-laden, and that explanations of economic life cannot be value-free. Market values, then, are
not just prices at which goods are exchanged, but expressions of a community’s values regarding
how social relationships ought to govern exchanges between people. Thus, what explains the
dynamics of an economy is how social values and economic activity interact and evolve together.
This means economics cannot be a purely positive science in the manner of the natural sciences,
nor should markets and economic activity be explained in a mechanical, ahistorical way.
Contemporary social economics maintains these ideas, but understands the idea of community in
a way appropriate to a globalized world. Communities are still local in regard to our most
immediate and familiar social relationships, but communities also exist between people in more
extended and diverse kinds of social relationships. In both cases, then, those relationships are
framed by social values which guide us in how we interact. Different social values are likely to
be operative in different types of social economic interaction. Social economics investigates these
differences to explain how economies work.
Let me, then, summarize the organization of this chapter.
Section 2 begins by first providing a brief overview of the complex systems approach that the
chapter employs, and then uses this to distinguish the main commitments underlying the competing
social economic and the mainstream economics visions of ethics and economics. My goal here is
to set up an interpretive framework for each vision that allows us to evaluate the key concepts and
principles their respective views maintain regarding how ethics and economics relate to one
another and create a single subject. For example, I will explain why they differ regarding whether
economics should be thought value-laden or should be value-free in terms of how they differ
regarding their different understandings of the interaction of ethics and economics.
Sections 3 and 4, then, inventory and discuss the key concepts and principles for each vision.
Because mainstream economics’ vision is the more influential of the two, I discuss it first in section
3 and then discuss the social economic vision in section 4. The latter vision, as less familiar and
as often thought more controversial, is clearer when contrasted to the former. In both sections, I
distinguish strong and weak versions of these respective views to show a range of opinion on the
positions and issues discussed. Section 5 returns to the interpretive framework from section 2 that
underlies the chapter, and briefly discusses the future prospects for ethics and economics as a
single subject of investigation.
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2. A complex systems approach to ethics and economics: Two visions of the subject
Of course, there are many views of what complex systems are, so ironically one needs to simplify
what we say about complex systems in order to be able to apply this framework effectively.
Accordingly, I draw on one, especially influential, straightforward conception of what a complex
system is that was developed by Herbert Simon, who though well known as a Nobel laureate
economist was also trained in political science, and was thus well aware that investigations
between established disciplines might produce new subjects of investigation.1
Simon’s (1962) main intuition about complex systems is that they are made up of multiple,
relatively independent subsystems whose interaction
•

influences both their own activities but also the performance of the whole complex system
which taken together they make up,

•

changes which in turn reverberate back upon how these subsystems interact,

•

so that the interacting subsystems and the whole system constantly influence each other in
a continuing dynamic of change.

Thus, Simon presupposes that interaction of relatively independent subsystems determines both
the nature of complex systems as single entities and how they change over time.
Applying this conception to ethics and economics would then be to say that ethics and economics
are each relatively independent subsystems, as their histories as separate disciplines implies, whose
interaction explains ethics and economics as a single subject of investigation. Heuristically,
•

a process of interaction between them ‘somehow’ influences how each operates,

•

this ‘somehow’ determines what ethics and economics is,

•

and this over-riding conception ‘somehow’ feeds back upon and influences their
interaction.

To conclude this section, I only explain the first ‘somehow’ for each of the two visions of ethics
and economics, and in the next two sections identify the additional ‘somehow’ connections in
relation to how the concepts and principles each vision employs produce their respective visions
of ethics and economics. Throughout, I distinguish strong and weak thesis versions of each vision.
In the mainstream economic vision, then, markets are a fundamental type of human activity, and
consequently non-market social processes, including ethical behavior, are either ultimately
reducible to market processes (the strong thesis), or are relatively unimportant compared to market
1

These two areas of expertise hardly capture Simon’s polymath capacities, which included computational science,
political science, cognitive psychology, sociology, public administration, management studies, and philosophy of
science. His complex systems thinking was arguably the product of his wide-ranging expertise.
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processes and should be set aside when they conflict with market processes (the weak thesis).
Broadly speaking, the economy subsumes society, or society is fully embedded in the economy.
Thus, in the interaction between social processes, here specifically ethical behavior, and market
processes as two relatively independent subsystems, market processes, or economics, determine
the scope and nature of ethical behavior, or ethics.
In contrast, in the social economic vision, social processes constitute the fundamental human
activity and include many forms of behavior, of which market behavior is only one form. In some
circumstances, then, social processes, including ethical behavior, preclude the existence of market
processes and show the ‘moral limits of markets’ (the strong thesis), and in other circumstances
social processes simply limit or condition market processes and require ‘taming the market’ (the
weak thesis). Broadly speaking, society subsumes the economy, or the economy is fully embedded
within society. In terms of the interaction between ethics and economics as two relatively
independent subsystems, ethics determines the scope and nature of economics.
Table 1 summarizes the strong and weak versions of these two visions.

Table 1
The mainstream and social economic visions of ethics and economics

Ethics and economics
visions

Strong thesis

Weak thesis

Mainstream economics:
society is embedded in the
economy

Social processes including
ethical ones are reducible to
market processes

Social processes including
ethical ones should be set
aside when they conflict with
market processes

Social economics: the
economy is embedded in
society

Social processes preclude
market processes:
‘moral limits of markets’

Social processes condition
market processes:
‘taming the market’

I turn, then, in sections 3 and 4 for each vision, to how each vision ‘somehow’ determines what
ethics and economics is, and how these over-riding conceptions of what it is ‘somehow’ feed back
6

upon and influence their interaction, including what this implies about economic and social policy.
Section 5, then closes the chapter with comments on the future status of ethics and economics as
a single subject of investigation.
3. The mainstream economic vision: Society embedded in the economy
If society is fully or essentially embedded in the economy, what does this tell us about what ethics
and economics is as a distinct subject of investigation and how this conception influences the
interaction between the two? The natural point of entry for addressing these questions is the
mainstream position on the positive-normative distinction, which frames its interpretation of ethics
and economics. Section 3.1 sets out this position. Section 3.2 then discusses efficiency as the
main ‘normative’ concept the mainstream employs. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss two key
principles of analysis central to mainstream reasoning about economic policy that bear on the
relationship between ethics and economics: the externalities concept and cost-benefit analysis.
3.1 The mainstream’s understanding of the positive-normative distinction
Mainstream economics’ understanding of the positive-normative distinction dates back to David
Hume’s (1739, 1978) strong separation of the positive and normative based on a distinction in
language between ‘is’ statements and ‘ought’ statements. ‘Is’ statements, Hume argued, concern
facts, and ‘ought’ statements concern values. Lionel Robbins ([1932], 1935) made this distinction
fundamental to mainstream (then neoclassical) economics when he inferred it implied a distinction
in types of discourses, associating science exclusively with positive statements and ethics primarily
with normative statements. What does this view, then, imply about economics or science and
ethics respectively?
Hume had argued in his famous ‘is-ought’ doctrine (the ‘Humean guillotine’) that ‘ought’ type
statements can never be inferred from ‘is’ type statements (Hume 1739, 1978: 469–470), from
which it followed that science and ethics should function as entirely separate domains with science
being the domain of positive statements and ethics being the domain of normative statements. The
risk of confusing the two has serious consequences for science, which is undermined when ‘ought’
type statements are admitted, and should statements of values replace statements of fact. In
contrast, ethics, particularly in the form of social policy, should be grounded in ‘is’ type statements,
so in principle ethics is strengthened by contact with science. This leaves open the status of values,
and mainstream economics has both strong and weak thesis positions on the matter.
The strong thesis, dating again back to Robbins, is that values are highly subjective and thus often
arbitrary, whereas facts are intersubjective and objective. Science thus needs to distance itself
from ethics. The weak thesis is that values need not always be subjective and arbitrary, though
why this might be the case is usually left unexplored and secondary to the importance invested in
science as a discourse that should be essentially value-free. An exception allowed in both cases is
that methodological value judgments, which concern how science is practiced – such things as the
desirability of clarity, consistency, a reliance on evidence, etc. – are compatible with, reasonable,
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openly acknowledged in economics, and thought to have no effect on economics’ nature as a
positive science (cf. Blaug, 1998).
Overall, then, the mainstream understanding of ethics and economics, based on its understanding
of the positive-normative distinction, does two things. First, it treats ethics and economics quite
asymmetrically. Economics and science are highly valued and ethics is seen as at best an
unreliable domain of intellectual investigation which is separate from economics. Second, the
mainstream view is quite unclear about the scope and nature of values since it proscribes ethical
ones, openly adopts methodological ones, and says little about what justifies this difference, while
still treating economics as if it were value-free. Not surprisingly, this often leads to the charge that
mainstream economics is positivist in comparison with other social sciences.2
If we emphasize just the asymmetry point, then, the mainstream vision fits the weak thesis above,
namely, the idea that markets are a fundamental type of human activity, and that other social
processes including ethics are relatively unimportant compared to market processes, and can
accordingly be largely ignored or left to others. However, if we emphasize the mainstream’s
positivism and ambiguity about the scope and nature of values that allows for methodological
values as if they are not values while proscribing ethical ones, the mainstream vision can be seen
to better fits the strong thesis that denies ethics’ coherence, or even reduces ethical values to market
values.
The strong thesis may seem improbable, especially compared to the more tolerant weak thesis, but
in the next subsection I argue that there exists a strong basis for it in the standard understanding of
the only ‘normative’ concept used in mainstream economics, namely, the efficiency concept.
3.2 Efficiency as a ‘normative’ concept
Efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is the idea that states of affairs which makes improvements in
how competitive markets work which leave no one worse off, as reflected in their given
preferences, ought to always be promoted. Thus, on the surface the efficiency concept is explicitly
normative since its expression requires an ‘ought’ type statement. Yet at the same time, as a
normative concept, efficiency as understood by most mainstream economists is different from
virtually all other normative concepts. Let me emphasize two points. On the one hand, that an
efficient state of affairs leaves no one worse off in preference satisfaction terms means that from
everyone’s own point of view such states of affairs should always be promoted. On the other hand,
while the preference concept of course has a technical meaning in economics associated with the
standard axioms regarding preferences that apply to it, one increasingly popular interpretation of
it is as a comprehensive measure by which people fully evaluate any and all of their choice
opportunities, as in Daniel Hausman’s characterization of preference as providing a ‘total
subjective evaluative comparison’ of all things that might enter into people’s choices (Hausman,
2012).

2

In fact, Robbins was influenced by interwar logical positivism, which followed Hume in the strong separation of
facts and values and subjectivist view of the latter as associated with emotivism, the meta-ethical doctrine that values
are merely expressions of feeling and attitude (cf. Davis, 2015).
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What these two points suggest is that efficiency judgments are essentially indisputable. If a state
of affairs A is efficient relative to a state of affairs B, then there exist no grounds for promoting B
and not promoting A. The idea is that were preference evaluations are comprehensive of
everything, not only can efficiency judgments never be reasonably contested, but should people
appear to have other normative concerns the all-inclusive view of preferences implies that those
normative concerns must be implicit in their preferences. An older view of preferences as
essentially self-regarding precluded this argument, because then other normative values could then
be set against efficiency as a product of self-regarding preferences. Yet mainstream economists
have given up this older, narrower view of preferences, become steadfastly agnostic about their
content, and thus removed the need to refer to other normative concepts in judging competing
states of affairs.3
There are two opposing ways, then, to interpret this outcome. On the one hand, it can be argued
that the full range of ethical thinking that philosophers have long investigated can now be seen as
implicit within mainstream economics explanation of choice behavior. To be clear, this does not
mean that economics as a science is no longer value-free, because it is not the science itself but
people’s own values as embedded in their preferences that might include other ethical values. On
the other hand, it can also be argued that the efficiency concept makes any reference to other ethical
values effectively redundant in economics. All that is needed, that is, for the analysis of
competitive markets is the efficiency concept. Which interpretation, then, is more likely?
The first view, that the full range of ethical thinking philosophers have long investigated can be
seen as implicit in economics, is pretty clearly at odds with economists’ general disinterest in
ethical values. In contrast, the second view that the efficiency concept is sufficient in economics
reflects much of mainstream economics’ ordinary practice, and so seems more likely. I argue,
then, that the centrality of the efficiency concept in economics supports the reductionist strong
thesis. Indeed, if we understand the efficiency concept as simply a positive description of a
particular state of affairs, namely, one in which as a matter of fact no person is worse off and at
least one better off, one does not need to make any reference to it as an ethical idea at all. It is
simply a positive description of a certain state of affairs without including any recommendation
that it be achieved, or any analysis of its normative desirability. Economists may happen to that
believe Pareto optima are normatively desirable, but this is incidental to their positive analysis of
markets. For economics, then, ethical values are fully reducible to market values, not, as in the
weak thesis, simply a relatively unimportant independent domain with which economics interacts.
3.3 Externalities
Addressing externalities is fundamental to mainstream economic reasoning about markets. Market
transactions are assumed to primarily affect only those engaged in them, but markets are not
perfect, and often give rise to unintended, third-party effects on others ‘external’ to those
transactions – spillover effects or externalities. Further, while (free and competitive) market
transactions where externalities do not occur must be efficient, since the parties to those
transactions see themselves as better off and no one is worse off, market transactions where they
3

Thus, a variety of kinds of non-standard preferences are typically excluded from consideration, such as, for example
preferences expressing envy.
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do occur can be inefficient since while the parties to those transactions are better off, third parties
can be worse off. Thus, economic analysis of externalities and how markets function is necessarily
framed in terms of realizing efficiency. This is often understood to be a matter of ‘internalizing’
externalities, or assuring that spillover costs are borne by the transacting parties, not by third
parties.
Thus, I suggest that a strong thesis emphasizes ‘internalizing’ externalities, and frames
‘externalities’ – despite the sense of the term – as phenomena properly seen as internal to market
processes once markets are made efficient and function competitively. Then, if efficiency is seen
as essentially a positive, non-normative concept, externalities are basically understood as
disturbances in markets rather than as reflecting normative issues. In effect, there is nothing truly
‘external’ to market processes. This, then, is consistent with the strong thesis regarding ethics and
economics and its reductionist approach to ethics.
In contrast, the weak thesis allows that there are circumstances where market transactions have
ethical spillover effects, such as when people regard market transactions as unfair or unjust, even
if they are otherwise efficient. An example might be low wage employment. In this case, rather
than deny that such effects occur in a competitive market system, emphasis falls on how they
should be treated. Thus, for negative externalities such effects are regarded as a special type of
cost that must somehow be borne by the parties to the relevant market transaction. However, this
translates an ethical judgment about right and wrong into a question of money expenditure, in this
case puts a price tag on fairness or justice, and makes ‘internalizing’ the externality a matter of
how market processes determine the meaning and scope of ethical ones.
Thus, the strong thesis regarding externalities eliminates ethics and the weak thesis translates it
into the language and metrics of economics. Consider now the nature and role of cost-benefit
analysis in mainstream economics.
3.4 Cost-benefit analysis
While the efficiency concept is fundamental to mainstream reasoning, in practice economists often
find it necessary to evaluate circumstances in which some state of affairs A is recommended over
another B even though some individuals are made worse off in A. They then reason in cost-benefit
terms, which involves showing that the balance of benefits and costs associated with A is superior
to that associated with B. This raises an interesting question: if efficiency is no longer the basis
for policy recommendation, and the seemingly broad idea of ‘benefit’ has come into play, might
normative principles regarding what is good then play a role in this less restricted form of
reasoning, thus opening up economics to a more substantial engagement with ethics?
One reason to think that the idea of ‘benefit’ might have broad normative meaning in standard
economics is that individuals determine what benefits them according to their preferences, and as
we saw above most economists believe that preferences need not be narrow and self-regarding,
but may apply to anything they might value (Hausman, 2012). Accordingly, cost-benefit analysis
must weigh whatever people value against costs, whether it is payoffs to themselves or the good
of others, and this accordingly opens the door to the possibility that a whole range of ethical views
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regarding what is good drive people’s preferences and might thus figure in an ‘ethically informed’
cost-benefit analysis.
Yet the standard view in economics regarding preferences, while potentially open in regard to the
scope of preferences, remains agnostic in regard to how they are factored into cost-benefit analysis.
This tells us what would be a strong thesis in the mainstream regarding cost-benefit analysis,
namely, that the content of preferences is irrelevant to registering people’s perceived benefit.
Economists, that is, may ignore any ethics-related dimensions of what people register as a likely
benefit, and simply through some preference elicitation method construct a value to put into the
balance with expected costs. It may then be shown that a state of affairs A ranks higher than a
state of affairs B, but it is irrelevant whether people believe the benefit from A is associated with
greater happiness, being able to lead ‘good’ lives, their social relationships being just, etc. Costbenefit analysis seen in this way does not require we discriminate between different views of what
is ethically good, and indeed ignores altogether any meanings people associate with ‘good.’
The weak thesis regarding cost-benefit analysis mirrors the weak thesis regarding externalities.
The point of cost-benefit analysis is to reach decisions for ranking alternative possible states of
affairs. Different people’s views of why a certain state of affairs is good may be helpful in creating
indices useful for producing aggregate measures of good. Suppose one group of people report that
they prefer a certain state of affairs because it makes them happier, and another group reports that
they prefer it because they believe it is more just. All the economist needs to do is provide weights
for these different views (perhaps according to their frequencies in a population), and then generate
a single measure of the ‘good’ that state of affairs would produce. Thus, again, the meaning of
what is good a – chief concern of normative reasoning – is collapsed into a market money metric.
The difference between the strong and weak views in regard to cost-benefit analysis are modest,
and in both cases cost-benefit analysis ends up being essentially as restrictive as efficiency
reasoning and standard analysis of externalities. In general, across all three subjects discussed in
this section, the difference between the strong and weak views is a difference between eliminating
ethics from economics and translating ethics into economics. Mainstream economics’ view of
ethics and economics, then, is that it basically can be explained fully in terms of economics. This
reflects its guiding conception that society is embedded in the economy and social processes are
explainable as market processes.
Table 2 summarizes the results of this section.

Table 2
The Mainstream Economic Vision: Society Embedded in the Economy
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Strong thesis:
reductionism

Weak thesis:
exclusion and translation

Positive-normative distinction

Science is objective and
ethics is subjective

Ethics unimportant compared
to science

Efficiency concept

Positive, non-normative

Other normative concepts
are not needed

Externalities with ethical
aspects

Internalized in competitive
markets

Treated as ‘costs’

Cost-benefit analysis

Benefit is only a measure of
preference

Good is translated into
monetary terms

4. The social economic vision: The economy embedded in society
In the social economics vision of what ethics and economics is, the economy is embedded in
society and social processes determine the nature and scope of market processes. To examine what
this involves I begin with the same starting point used in my discussion mainstream economics’
vision, namely, how a social economic approach understands the positive-normative distinction.
Section 4.1 set out this view, and then distinguishes strong and weak theses regarding how ethics
and economics are related to one another as separate yet ‘entangled’ subjects. Section 4.2 then
turns to what the social economic vision treats as alternative to the mainstream’s emphasis on
efficiency, namely, a much broader view of how normative principles pervade economic life. To
structure this view, I frame it in terms of four different types of capabilities and the moral values
associated with those capabilities, and then also distinguish strong and weak views on the matter.
Section 4.3 then returns to the issue of ‘entanglement’ and (parallel to sections 3.3 and 3.4)
discusses two guiding principles regarding social policies towards markets: prohibition and
intervention.
4.1 Social economics’ understanding of the positive-normative distinction
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Whereas the mainstream’s view of the positive-normative distinction is based on Hume’s ‘isought’ distinction, the social economic view is that this involves a mistaken understanding of the
nature of language. Of course, ‘is’ statements can be distinguished from ‘ought’ statements when
different statements contain only those terms. However, the mainstream inference that a statement
free of ‘ought’ language or its equivalents must be purely descriptive and value-free is at odds with
modern philosophy of language’s emphasis on the determinants of meaning. Indeed, it is generally
argued by philosophers today that the meanings of terms are highly dependent on context and how
they are used in speech and communication. A consequence of this is that terms that appear to be
entirely descriptive can also convey normative and prescriptive content depending on how people
interpret and use the statements in which they appear. It follows that descriptive statements may
well be (though are not necessarily) value-laden. It further follows that we cannot assume that
science is value-free simply because it is expressed in descriptive language. This applies especially
to economics and the social sciences where the terms used in theories have multiple meanings and
layers of interpretations.
An influential recent example of this understanding is Hilary Putnam’s characterization of the
descriptive term ‘cruel’ used in reference to infamous Roman emperors. The statement, ‘Nero was
a cruel Roman emperor,’ is descriptive, but the term ‘cruel’ also implies for most people that we
ought to judge Nero as inhumane and immoral (Putnam 2002: 34; cf. Davis 2015). Putnam labels
this mixing up of descriptions and prescriptions and facts and values in ordinary language the
entanglement thesis. Contrary to Hume, it allows us to infer ‘ought’ statements from ‘is’
statements. Nonetheless, this does not imply that we cannot distinguish science and ethics.
Clearly, they are different types of investigations. The point rather is that different types of
investigations can influence and affect one another – a two-way street relationship in the case of
ethics and economics, rather than the one-way street economics to ethics, asymmetric relation that
the mainstream assumes.4
Consider in the case of economics, then, the status of the theory of rational choice. If one reviews
textbook accounts, one finds the theory explained in a purely descriptive way as if it were valuefree. Yet the history and development of the theory is bound up with – entangled with, Putnam
would say – defenses of individual freedom and autonomy, which are normative ideals. Certainly,
the theory retains a descriptive function, and can be used to describe choice behavior without
making reference to those ideals. However, that does not mean that those associations and
meanings are absent, so, as in Putnam’s Nero example, rational choice theory is looked upon by
economists favorably both for its descriptive usefulness and also because it implicitly prescribes
these normative ideals. Thus, rational choice theory is value-laden.
This then raises the question: how are ethics and economics as two types of discourse related to
one another in the social economic vision when they are both separate domains of investigation
and yet also entangled? At the end of section 2, I distinguished a strong thesis and a weak thesis
for the social economic vision that market processes are embedded in social processes. Let me
state them here more fully.

4

On this, see Elgin’s (1989) discussion of the relativity of facts and objectivity of values.
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The strong thesis – I associate this especially with the ‘moral limits of markets’ view – responds
to the entanglement idea by distinguishing a domain of social life from which market processes
should be excluded. Its argument is essentially that normative principles have meanings that
cannot be reduced to the logic of market processes, that doing so is morally repugnant (Roth 2007)
and tends to ‘crowd out’ those principles, so that there are certain domains of social life that should
simply be ‘off limits’ to markets. That is, some things are ‘priceless.’
I distinguish two versions of the strong thesis. On the one hand, one might emphasize that markets
are often destructive of normative principles, as Michael Sandel has argued in connection with the
idea that there are some things that ‘money can’t buy’ (Sandel 2012). For example, though
insurance markets and court proceedings put a price on people’s lives, Sandel argues human life
cannot have a price. This focus, however, sets aside the issue of whether ethics is entangled with
economics within markets themselves. On the other hand, then, a second version of the strong
thesis argues that different ethical principles operate within markets and outside markets, so that
the moral limits of markets view is rather a matter of determining which belongs in which. For
example, one might argue that even if market processes exhibit commutative justice (the idea that
an exchange of equals is equitable) they cannot be expected to address distributive justice (the
socially equitable distributions of goods). Both versions of the strong, ‘off limits’ thesis, then,
emphasize establishing normative boundaries on market activity.
The weak thesis – what I term the ‘taming the market’ view – focuses on how markets need to be
transformed to be ethically acceptable, less than on what is normatively ‘off limits’ to markets.
This perspective emphasizes policies designed to change how markets themselves function, and
aims at making ethical values central to their performance and the effects they have on market
prices and quantities. In effect, the strategy is to replace (or augment) the mainstream’s sole
reliance on efficiency reasoning as a means regulating markets. Indeed, to the extent that
efficiency reasoning is thought by some mainstream economists to be a non-normative, value-free
type of intervention in markets, the conviction behind the ‘taming the market’ view is that markets
are thoroughly value-laden, and the issue is then which values ought to prevail. Below I will
identify two different types of strategies this approach involves: ones aimed at directly intervening
in how market outcomes are produced – a direct strategy – and ones aimed at changing the
underlying conditions affecting how market outcomes are produced – an indirect strategy.
Given, then, this understanding of the positive-normative distinction and these two theses, I turn
to a social economic understanding of how normative principles pervade economic life.
4.2 Capabilities, moral values, and human dignity
If, contrary to mainstream economics the positive and normative are not strongly separated, then
we need to explain how economic life is value-laden. There are a variety of ways that this can be
done, but one particularly influential way involves the capability approach developed by Amartya
Sen. Sen believes one of the main failures of modern economics is its tendency to become an
‘engineering’ science and consequent failure to integrate ethics and economics (Sen, 1987). As a
means of correcting this, his capability approach builds economics around a broad conception of
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freedom that concerns people’s activities in all domains of life. Thus, in referring to people’s
capabilities, Sen states:
What people can positively achieve … is influenced by economic opportunities, political
liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and
the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives (Sen, 1999, 5).
Sen then makes two distinctions that he uses to distinguish four different forms of what may be to
a person’s individual advantage. The first distinction is between what promotes a person’s wellbeing and what promotes a person’s overall agency goals, or “goals other than the advancement of
his or her well-being” (Sen, 1993: 35). The second distinction is between a person being able to
actually achieve something and the person simply having the freedom to pursue the objectives she
wants to achieve (Ibid.). Combining these two distinctions, he labels the four forms of individual
advantage people have as: (1) well-being achievement, (2) agency achievement, (3) well-being
freedom, and (4) agency freedom.
I argue, then, that each of these four cases can be associated with a distinct moral value, so that
promoting these capabilities is also a matter of promoting these different moral values.5
Specifically:
•

Well-being achievement concerns what all people should have, irrespective of their
individual circumstances. Sen’s own examples are being able to avoid premature mortality
and being adequately nourished. Well-being achievement, then, is naturally associated
with promoting equality since no one should be excluded from this most basic level of
well-being.

•

Well-being freedom concerns what a person freely does to promote her well-being, even if
she is not successful in achieving it. An example is the pursuit of higher education. In this
case, it falls upon the person to take responsibility for promoting their own well-being, so
the idea of personal responsibility is central.

•

Agency achievement addresses goals that people want to achieve which are not associated
with their own well-being. For example, a disabled individual might value personal
independence, even if they are not made better off by achieving it. When we place a moral
value on this goal, we value a person’s right to personal independence in itself. As
something that should be achieved, it may be considered a right, and more generally as
applies to all people who wish to have it, a human right.

•

Agency freedom also concerns goals other than personal well-being, but in this case, it is
not their achievement that is important but rather a person’s ability to pursue them. For
example, people provide care for others, the elderly, refugees, the sick, etc., and this is done

5

Similarly, Davis and McMaster (2017) uses Sen’s framework to identify link these four forms of individual
advantage with particular moral values important to people’s health care capabilities.
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for its own sake and whether or not improves others’ well-being. The moral value that this
promotes is freedom, in both its negative and positive senses, since care for others enhances
their freedoms by both reducing constraints on their lives and increasing their power to
pursue their lives.
Table 3 presents these four forms of individual advantage and the moral values they involve. To
be clear, others might link moral values to these four cases differently from the ones proposed
here, which are only offered as reasonable interpretations of what they each normatively imply.
The main point is that economic life is value-laden, and that our examination of it needs to make
this explicit, not proceed as if the positive and normative are strongly separated.

Table 3
Four different types of individual advantage and associated moral values

Achievement

Freedom to achieve

Well-being

Overall agency goals

Well-being achievement:

Agency achievement:

equality

human rights

Well-being freedom:

Agency freedom:

Responsibility

Negative and positive
freedom

This analysis, then, tells us what sorts of moral values may be associated with different forms of
economic behavior according to what people’s aims are, but it does not tell us anything about the
relative importance of the two in economic life. One might, for example, argue that most people
are as a matter of fact mostly concerned with their well-being achievement and that, say, agency
freedom, the furthest removed from that, rarely concerns them. This would imply that equality is
especially important in economic life, and that securing others’ negative and positive freedom is
less important. Or, one might argue that all four forms are equally present in economic life,
implying that all four types of moral values are as well. Other possibilities could also be
considered.
Consequently, if we are to explain both how pervasive normative principles are in economic life
and also what normative principles tend to prevail in economic life, we need to be able to say
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something about the prevalence of these different forms of individual advantage in economic life
themselves. That is, our ‘positive’ economic analysis needs to guide us in establishing the scope
and nature of our normative analysis in economic life. To proceed without this foundation and
point of entry is to run the risk of simply imposing the analyst’s moral preferences on one’s
explanation of economic life, irrespective of whether people’s behavior justifies it – thus reseparating ethics and economics, but from the vantage point of ethics!
Thus, to broadly distinguish two social economic views of ethics and economics, here I distinguish
strong and weak views regarding how value-laden economic life is and regarding what normative
principles prevail in economic life, as associated with two positions on the importance of these
different forms of individual advantage in economic life.
The weak thesis essentially assumes that well-being achievement and well-being freedom are the
dominant concerns of most people in economic life, reflecting economics’ long preoccupation with
well-being. It follows that the moral values that most importantly underlie economic life are
equality and responsibility. In effect, people ought to have equal chances when it comes to
assuring basic education and health, and then it falls upon them individually and becomes their
responsibility should they aspire to further levels of achievement. I characterize this as a weak
thesis because of its more limited scope regarding what normative principles are important in
economic life.
The strong thesis, then, can be contrasted with the weak thesis according to the greater scope it
assumes applies to what normative principles are important in economic life. Reflecting Sen’s
influence in making goals other than well-being a part of ethics and economics, this view assumes
that all four forms of individual advantage are important in economic life, and accordingly that, in
addition to equality and responsibility, human rights and positive and negative freedom are
important moral values in economics as well. Thus, for the strong thesis, the economy and
economics is highly value-laden, whereas for the weak thesis they are modestly value-laden.
Table 4 sets out these two positions.

Table 4
Positions regarding the pervasiveness of moral values in economic life

Positions

Forms of individual
advantage

Moral values

Weak thesis

Well-being achievement and
well-being freedom

Equality and responsibility
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Strong thesis

Well-being achievement,
well-being freedom, agency
achievement, agency freedom

Equality, responsibility,
human rights, negative and
positive freedom

I close this section, then, with a brief comment regarding human dignity as the over-arching value
in the social economic approach to ethics and economics. The capability approach supports
multiple social values and can be interpreted in weak and strong thesis terms. This suggests that
it lacks a unifying vision, so that how moral values enter into economic life has no clear
interpretation. However, what this approach emphasizes overall, I argue, is the moral value of the
person, or the central importance of human dignity. To see this, consider how the entanglement
view treats individuals as compared to the mainstream economic conception of individuals.
In light of its strong separation of the positive and normative, the mainstream conception explains
individuals in purely positive terms in that their behavior depends on their private preferences,
which as subjective in nature thus have no particular relationship to social values. In contrast, in
an entangled world individual behavior cannot be explained without reference to values, and as a
consequence individuals are embedded in a world of social values. It follows that individuals are
moral beings, and as such are themselves objects of moral concern. What does it mean, then, to
say that individuals are objects of moral concern? In the social economic vision, it is to invest
individuals with moral importance, or regard individuals as entitled to moral respect. This is to
invest individuals with human dignity, and, assuming that individuals are fundamental to the social
world, it makes human dignity an over-arching moral value underlying the social economic
approach to ethics and economics.
In the next two sections, then, I turn to two approaches to social policies central to the social
economic vision of ethics and economics.

4.3 The moral limits of markets view: prohibitions-based social policies
I characterized the moral limits of markets view as the entanglement strong thesis, and
distinguished two versions. Sandel’s version emphasizes what ‘money can’t buy’ or should not
be priced in certain domains of social life – what Roth treats as morally ‘repugnant’ – and says
that these domains are simply ‘off limits’ to market processes. The other version of the strong
thesis instead argues that different ethical principles operate within markets and outside markets,
so that the moral limits of markets view is rather a matter of determining which principles belong
in which domains.
What these two versions share in social policy prescription terms is the idea of hard and fast
prohibitions on where and how markets ought to operate. Social policy prescriptions reflect
policies that are cast at the level of society. As such, they do not involve the sorts of policies that
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mainstream economics employs, where the focus is on adjusting the performance of markets
through changes in prices and incomes. Rather, policy typically operates at an institutional level
in adjusting the place and role of markets as a particular type (and only one type) of social
institution. Needless to say, policy conceived in this way as social policy is foreign to the thinking
of those who subscribe to the opposite view that society is fully embedded in the market process.
At the same time, proponents of ‘off limits’ thinking find the idea that social policies regarding
markets are a matter of adjusting prices and incomes short-sighted and misguided.
What, then, are the main mechanisms used to establish the moral limits of markets? Prohibitions
first and foremost take the form of laws that compel certain types of behavior irrespective of
people’s economic incentives, thus demonstrating the reach and priority of law as a social domain
independent of the market process. Not all laws are motivated by moral considerations, but many
are, such as laws prohibiting owning people or slavery. Secondly, prohibitions take the form of
custom and convention. Again, custom and convention is not always motivated by moral
considerations, but they often are, as for example when it is said that elected representatives in
democratic societies should not allow themselves to be influenced by personal gain.
4.4 The taming the market: interventions-based social policies
I characterized the taming the market view as the entanglement weak thesis. Rather than seeking
to segregate social domains according to the normative principles that apply or do not apply within
them, the aim in this instance is to change the way markets function to make them normatively
more acceptable. Markets are value-laden, then, but usually insufficiently so. While markets may
exhibit efficiency, they ought also, for example, function in an equitable way. This version of the
entanglement thesis is thus weak compared to the strong thesis in that the degree of change it calls
for through social policy is more modest. Nothing is necessarily ‘off limits’ to markets; markets
simply need to give further support to normative considerations in how they function. I then
distinguish the policy strategies this view involves as direct and indirect in regard to how they aim
to change the ways that markets function.
Specifically, the direct strategy aims at changing market outcomes by intervening in the way that
markets adjust. One such strategy involves imposing price controls such as price floors in the case
of minimum wages and price ceilings in the case of rent controls. By setting floors and ceilings,
prices are prevented from moving to equilibrium levels. Alternatively, the direct strategy can take
the form of quantity controls, such as when air and water quality is protected by capping industrial
effluents, the result of which again is that markets do not adjust to equilibrium levels. Thus, in
both cases rather than only supply-and-demand forces, normative principles determine how
markets adjust.
In contrast, the indirect strategy aims at changing market outcomes by influencing the underlying
determinants of market behavior. For example, taxes and subsidies shift supply and demand
curves, and this changes equilibrium prices and quantities. ‘Sin’ taxes on goods believed to be
harmful or undesirable raise their prices and discourage their consumption. Public spending for
education lowers its price by increasing its supply. Market adjustment operates normally, but
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changing the basis on which goods are demanded and supplied improves the outcomes that result
in a normative way.
Needless to say, both the direct and indirect intervention strategies can be used in a complementary
way to achieve any given normative goal. Indeed, interventions-based social policies and
prohibitions-based social policies above can also be used in a complementary way to achieve the
same normative goals. What distinguishes the interventions approach, then, is the idea that since
markets have significant effects on normative goals, they need to be made more value-laden,
whereas the prohibitions approach sees markets themselves as less entangled. Thus, the two
broadly different approaches here ultimately differ on their views of entanglement and valueladenness.
5. Future prospects for ethics and economics as a single subject of investigation
The point of entry for this chapter, the status of ethics and economics, asks whether the two types
of investigation involved function as a single subject of investigation or rather as an intersection
of two largely independent disciplinary investigations. As Cat’s taxonomy of different forms of
disciplinary interaction makes clear, there exist quite different ways in which we can understand
how different disciplines interact (Cat 2017), and consequently we need to proceed on a case-bycase basis. What this chapter did, then, was map how the two main visions of the relationship
between ethics and economics, based on their opposed understandings of the positive-normative
distinction, support two possible, quite different conceptions of ethics and economics.
The fundamental importance of the positive-normative distinction to these two conceptions reflects
its deep philosophical nature. Not only are important philosophical questions about central
concepts in human thinking involved, but far-reaching questions about the nature of science and
intellectual investigation are part of how this distinction is understood. This might seem to imply,
since deep philosophical issues are perennial, that the relationship between ethics and economics,
to the extent that it depends on how this distinction is understood, will always remain unresolved,
and accordingly we will always have two competing visions of the relationship between these two
kinds of investigation and two domains of social life.
This may well be what lies in the future for ethics and economics, but there is also a reason to
think that the two visions will be replaced by a single one, specifically, the social economic vision.
I indicated at the outset that, in my view, the social economic vision best describes the relationship
between ethics and economics. I previously explained why I think this (Davis 2015), which was
essentially that the philosophical arguments against the Humean view of the positive-normative
distinction that underlies the mainstream view are correct and that philosophers are in agreement
that they are correct. Further, I argued that proponents in economics of the Humean view either
ignore the philosophical arguments against it or suggest reasons for defending it that do not get
exposed to serious scrutiny, either from philosophers or others. Thus, proponents of the Humean
view seem to have little more to defend their position than loyalty to an inherited, unexamined
thinking that has characterized mainstream economics since Robbins. This suggests that the
foundation of their vision of economics as an essentially positive science is tenuous at best.
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Of course, this does not tell us that the social economic vision of ethics and economics will
ultimately prevail. Factors other than rational argument often determine how disciplines develop
over time. At the same time, in the long run history of the sciences and intellectual investigation
views that do not have the support of the large majority usually fail and are abandoned, and
mainstream economists are isolated in social science in regard to this issue. Thus, it seems that
the future prospects for an entangled ethics and economics as a single subject of investigation seem
to be good.
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